The Battle of the Bulge

On 16 September Hitler announced the outline of a western counteroffensive through the Ardennes toward Antwerp. The intention was strategic rather than local: cross the Meuse, split the British and American armies and seize the port that had become central to Allied logistics.

By late October the senior commanders expected to execute the offensive had been shown the scale of Hitler's objective. Model, Rundstedt and Manteuffel doubted that Army Group B possessed the force required to reach Antwerp and hold the corridor behind it.

The 10 November directive formalised the concentration for Wacht am Rhein and imposed strict secrecy. The codename itself suggested a defensive posture on the Rhine rather than an offensive aimed far into Belgium.

First Army G-2 Colonel Benjamin Dickson issued Intelligence Estimate No. 37 on 10 December after noting German armoured reserves and other signs of concentration. He believed the enemy retained the capability for a major counterstroke.

On 15 December the Ardennes still functioned in Allied planning as an economy-of-force sector. The 106th Infantry Division had only recently entered the line, while the 28th and 4th Infantry Divisions had been badly worn in the Hürtgen fighting.

At 05:30 on 16 December German artillery opened across the Ardennes front. Infantry moved forward under low cloud, fog and snow before the main armoured columns could exploit the penetrations.

Near Lanzerath, Lieutenant Lyle Bouck's 18-man intelligence and reconnaissance platoon of the 394th Infantry, reinforced by artillery observers, occupied prepared positions overlooking one of the routes needed by the northern German attack.

During the first day reports reaching Allied headquarters were fragmentary and often contradictory. What was initially unclear was whether the attack was a large spoiling operation or the opening of a strategic offensive.

At the Baugnez crossroads on 17 December, Kampfgruppe Peiper encountered a column from the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion. After the Americans surrendered, prisoners were assembled in a field beside the road.

Elsewhere on 17 December, eleven African American soldiers of the 333rd Field Artillery Battalion became separated from their unit and reached a farmhouse near Wereth, where civilians gave them shelter.

Two special operations added uncertainty behind the American front. Operation Greif sent small teams using captured vehicles, equipment and American uniforms to disrupt signs, communications and traffic. Operation Stösser dropped German paratroopers behind the northern front.

On 17 December Eisenhower released the 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, the SHAEF reserve then refitting after the Netherlands campaign. Orders sent them toward the two parts of the German penetration that were becoming most dangerous.

The 99th and 2nd Infantry Divisions fell back through Krinkelt-Rocherath toward the Elsenborn Ridge while German formations tried to open the roads west for Sixth Panzer Army.

On the evening of 18 December Peiper's column reached the Neufmoulin bridge near Habiemont after earlier bridge demolitions and fighting had already forced changes of route. Engineers of the 291st Engineer Combat Battalion were preparing the crossing for destruction.

The 7th Armored Division and elements of several infantry formations assembled around St Vith as the central German penetration expanded. The town mattered because a network of roads and rail lines converged there.

At Verdun on 19 December Eisenhower met the senior commanders responsible for the response. He framed the penetration as an opportunity to attack an exposed German salient once its shoulders were stabilised.

The 101st Airborne Division arrived in the Bastogne area on 18–19 December and joined Combat Command B of the 10th Armored Division, artillery, engineers and remnants of units already falling back through the road centre.

The 422nd and 423rd Infantry Regiments of the 106th Division had been encircled east of the Our after German forces passed around the Schnee Eifel. An ordered breakout toward Schönberg began too late to reopen a secure route west.

By 20 December the German penetration had disrupted Bradley's direct communications with First and Ninth Armies north of the salient. Eisenhower temporarily placed those armies under Montgomery's 21st Army Group so that one headquarters could control the northern battle.

By 21 December German forces had cut the principal roads into Bastogne and the American position was encircled. The perimeter included the 101st Airborne, armour, artillery, engineers and other units gathered during the retreat.

With German forces around the flanks and the routes west narrowing, the American command authorised withdrawal from the St Vith salient. The defenders had already held the road centre several days beyond the German timetable.

On 22 December German emissaries entered the Bastogne perimeter under a white flag with a written demand for surrender. The message warned that continued resistance would lead to destruction of the encircled force.

On 23 December the weather improved enough for Allied tactical aviation and transport aircraft to operate over the Ardennes in strength. Ninth Air Force fighters and bombers attacked roads, rail movement, vehicles and supporting positions.

On 23 December more than two hundred C-47 transports flew supply missions into the Bastogne perimeter, dropping ammunition, food and medical stores. Gliders and later flights brought additional supplies and medical personnel.

By 24 December elements of 2nd Panzer Division had reached the Celles area, roughly four miles from the Meuse near Dinant. This was the deepest penetration achieved by the German offensive.

Bastogne remained under artillery and air attack through Christmas. A German raid during the night struck the town and hit a medical facility on the Rue de Neufchâteau, killing wounded personnel and Belgian nurse Renée Lemaire among others.

Kampfgruppe Peiper had become isolated around La Gleize after American forces regained Stavelot behind it and bridge demolitions closed alternative routes. Fuel, ammunition and recovery capacity were running down inside the pocket.

On 26 December elements of the 4th Armored Division broke through near Assenois and made contact with the Bastogne perimeter. The first corridor was narrow and remained under German fire.

On 1 January the Luftwaffe launched Operation Bodenplatte against Allied airfields in Belgium and the Netherlands. More than eight hundred German fighters and fighter-bombers took part in the surprise attack.

On 3 January First Army began its major attack south from the northern shoulder while Third Army continued pressing north. The operational aim was now to reduce the salient rather than merely stop further German movement west.

By early January the German high command no longer expected the Ardennes operation to achieve its original objective. On 8 January Hitler authorised limited withdrawals from the western tip of the salient.

On 16 January patrols from First and Third Armies met near Houffalize, closing the gap between the Allied forces attacking from the northern and southern shoulders.

American troops re-entered St Vith on 23 January after fighting through the eastern part of the salient. The road centre that had delayed Fifth Panzer Army in December was now again behind the Allied line.

By 25 January the U.S. Army campaign boundary closes with the German salient largely eliminated and the front returned approximately to its pre-offensive position. Some local fighting and adjustments continued beyond that date.