10 May to 25 June 1940 · France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg · Forty-seven days
Follow the Battle of France from the German invasion of the Low Countries and the breakthrough across the Meuse to the evacuation at Dunkirk, the second German offensive and the armistices that ended organised fighting. The timeline explains why the Allied armies moved into Belgium, how German armour reached the Channel, what Operation Dynamo saved and why France was defeated despite determined resistance and substantial modern equipment.
Bundesarchiv Bild 101I-299-1808-10A · CC BY-SA 3.0 DE · Source
The Allied Dyle-Breda plan answered a political and military problem. Belgium contained the ground on which the main German advance was expected, and moving French and British armies forward offered a shorter line while protecting Belgian territory and the Channel ports. The French Seventh Army extended the manoeuvre toward Breda in the Netherlands, committing one of the coalition's most mobile formations far to the north.
Army Group A meanwhile concentrated seven panzer divisions opposite Luxembourg and the Ardennes. The forested region contained a limited road network and imposed severe congestion on German columns, yet the traffic continued west toward the Meuse. French planning expected enough warning to reinforce the river line before a large mechanised force could convert the Ardennes march into an assault crossing.
Sedan, Dinant and Monthermé became the hinge of the campaign. Once bridgeheads formed on 13 May, the ground west of the river opened toward Rethel, Saint-Quentin, the Somme and the Channel. The German operational objective shifted from crossing a defended river to maintaining movement faster than Allied headquarters could assemble a new continuous front.
French commander-in-chief Maurice Gamelin entered the campaign with the strongest Allied field armies committed to the movement into Belgium. The plan had logic inside the coalition's political and geographic constraints, yet it left the central reserve structure thin behind the Ardennes-Meuse sector. The German attack therefore created two simultaneous problems: a major battle in Belgium and a rapidly widening rupture farther south.
German panzer corps used radio networks and mission-oriented command to preserve tempo through congestion, crossings and unexpected resistance. Corps and division commanders redirected columns while engineers built bridges and Luftwaffe units concentrated against selected points. Allied commands possessed radios, aircraft and motorised formations of their own, but the coalition's reporting and decision cycle moved through more headquarters and often reached units after the local situation had changed.
The front broke cumulatively. Reserve placement, the collapse of Ninth Army sectors, delayed counterattacks, disrupted communications and the westward movement of German armour reinforced one another. Weygand inherited the command on 19 May with the northern armies almost severed from the main French front; his later defence on the Somme and Aisne began from a strategic position created during the first ten days.
41st Tank Battalion, at Stonne
Took his Char B1 bis into Stonne and destroyed thirteen German tanks in one action. His tank came out with about 140 hits on it, none of which had penetrated. It is the single clearest answer to the claim that France was beaten because its equipment was inadequate.
Allied commander-in-chief to 19 May
Committed every mobile formation forward into Belgium on the first morning and kept no strategic reserve, then ran the battle from a headquarters at Vincennes with no radio, sending written orders by motorcycle. Asked by Churchill on 16 May where the reserve was, he answered that there was none.
4th Armoured Division, then Under-Secretary for War
Had argued in print in 1934 for a concentrated armoured force with radio, sold about 700 copies in France, and was read attentively in Germany. Counterattacked at Montcornet with what he could scrape together, joined the government for eleven days, and flew to London to broadcast an appeal almost nobody heard.
Commander-in-chief from 19 May
Recalled from Syria at 73 to take over a battle already lost, abandoned the continuous front for defence in depth, and then argued in the government for an armistice on the grounds that the army should not be destroyed and that Britain would be beaten within weeks.
Flag Officer Dover, Operation Dynamo
Ran the evacuation from a room cut into the cliff at Dover that had held a dynamo in the previous war, which is where the operation got its name. Planned for 45,000 men and lifted 338,226. He would plan the naval side of Overlord four years later.
Staff officer, First Army, and historian
A medievalist of international standing serving as a fuel supply officer at 53. He wrote his analysis of the defeat that summer and hid it, joined the Resistance, and was tortured and shot by the Gestapo near Lyon in June 1944. His book remains the best thing written about the six weeks.
Head of government from 16 June 1940
Eighty-four years old and the defender of Verdun, brought into the government as a symbol of resolve and immediately arguing for an armistice. He took office on 16 June, asked for terms the same night, and spent the next four years governing a state that collaborated with the occupier.
Chief of staff, Heeresgruppe A
Argued against his own high command for months that the weight should go through the Ardennes and cut behind the Allied armies after they moved into Belgium. He was posted to a corps to shut him up, and got the argument to Hitler directly at a lunch. He commanded nothing decisive in the campaign and he designed it.
XIX Corps
Crossed the Meuse at Sedan on the fourth day and reached the Channel on the eleventh, twice ignoring orders to halt and once offering his resignation over it. He had spent a decade arguing that armour should be concentrated and given radio, and France is the demonstration.
7th Panzer Division
Moved so fast and reported so little that his own corps frequently did not know where he was, which is why the division was called the Ghost Division. At Arras he was badly frightened by British heavy tanks and turned 88 mm anti-aircraft guns on them, a use of that gun he would repeat in Africa.
French Char B1 bis and Somua S35 tanks carried armour and guns capable of dominating many direct encounters with German vehicles. British Matilda II tanks at Arras also forced German formations to bring heavier anti-tank and artillery weapons into action. Allied armoured performance at Hannut, Stonne and Arras showed the combat power available inside individual units.
German advantage appeared most clearly in formation design and communications. Panzer divisions concentrated tanks with motorised infantry, engineers, artillery and reconnaissance, while radio-equipped command networks accelerated reports and changes of direction. Early Panzer III and Panzer IV variants carried modest armour by later standards, yet they operated inside a system designed to turn a local crossing or gap into movement at corps depth.
Air power amplified that system. Ju 87 dive bombers and other Luftwaffe formations struck crossing sites, artillery positions, communications and moving columns while Bf 109 fighters contested the air. French Dewoitine D.520s and British fighters remained dangerous opponents. The campaign's decisive air effects came from concentration over critical ground battles and the pressure placed on roads, headquarters and supply movement.
France · heavy battle tank · 75 mm hull gun, 47 mm turret gun and up to 60 mm armour
The Char B1 bis was difficult for standard German anti-tank guns to defeat and performed effectively at Stonne. Its limitations included high fuel consumption, mechanical complexity, a one-man turret and restricted radio availability.
France · cavalry tank · 47 mm gun and cast armour
The S35 combined useful speed, protection and firepower and fought effectively during the armoured battles in Belgium. The one-man turret increased the commander's workload and many vehicles lacked reliable tactical communications.
United Kingdom · infantry tank · 2-pounder gun and heavy armour
Matilda II tanks at Arras resisted most German anti-tank fire and caused local disruption. Their small numbers and the limited scale of the counterattack prevented a larger operational effect.
Germany · medium tank · 3.7 cm gun and radio-equipped crew
The Panzer III was intended for tank combat and served in concentrated armoured divisions. Its gun was not superior to the best French weapons, but radios and combined-arms organisation increased the formation's responsiveness.
Germany · medium support tank · short-barrelled 7.5 cm gun
The early Panzer IV supplied high-explosive fire against guns, buildings and infantry positions. It remained a minority vehicle during the campaign and operated alongside much lighter Panzer I and II tanks.
Germany · VHF transmitter-receiver used in command and platoon tanks
German armoured formations used radio networks for reports, orders and changes of direction. Not every German tank carried the same transmitter arrangement, but unit-level radio integration was stronger than in most Allied armoured formations.
Germany · single-engine dive bomber · precision ground-attack aircraft
Ju 87 groups attacked artillery positions, road movement and defended crossings. At Sedan, repeated air attacks suppressed parts of the French defence while assault troops crossed the Meuse.
Germany · single-seat fighter · cannon and machine-gun armament
The Bf 109E escorted bombers and contested air superiority over the Low Countries and France. Its performance was competitive with British and French fighters, while captured airfields reduced operating distances as the campaign advanced.
Germany · heavy anti-aircraft gun used against aircraft, armour and ground targets
German units used the 8.8 cm gun in direct fire against heavily armoured Allied tanks, including during the Arras fighting. Its high velocity made it effective, but it was not the only German weapon or tactic used to stop the counterattack.
Germany · troop-carrying glider · used at Eben-Emael and bridge objectives
The DFS 230 delivered small assault teams directly onto or beside fortified objectives without a parachute dispersal pattern. At Eben-Emael it enabled engineers carrying shaped charges to land on the fortress roof.
French state and memorial sources commonly place military deaths in the May-June campaign near sixty thousand, while broader accounting series can produce higher totals depending on dates and categories. About 1.8 million French military personnel entered captivity, and roughly 1.6 million were transferred to Germany.
German campaign records list about twenty-seven thousand dead, roughly eighteen thousand missing and more than one hundred thousand wounded. British Army casualties reached tens of thousands across the fighting and evacuation, while Belgian, Dutch, French colonial, Polish and other Allied forces carried additional losses within their own national records.
The civilian exodus moved about eight million people onto roads and railways as the front crossed Belgium and northern France. Refugees travelled among military columns, government offices and withdrawing units under air attack and rapidly changing territorial control. Their movement became part of the operational landscape while families, towns and state institutions were displaced south and west.
Nearly 60,000
French state and memorial summaries commonly use a figure near sixty thousand for the May–June campaign; totals vary with accounting boundaries.
About 1.8 million
Roughly 1.6 million were transferred to Germany, where many remained in captivity until 1945.
About 27,000
German campaign records also list roughly 18,000 missing and more than 100,000 wounded.
338,226
Operation Dynamo removed British, French and other Allied servicemen between 26 May and 4 June.
About 8 million
People fled Belgium and northern and eastern France as the front, armies and government services moved south and west.
Marc Bloch wrote Strange Defeat during the three months following the fall of France, after he returned home from military service. In the midst of his anguish, he nevertheless "brought to his study of the crisis all the critical faculty and all the penetrating analysis of a first-rate historian" (Christian Science Monitor)
EUR 6.72
To Lose a Battle: France 1940 is the final book of Alistair Horne's trilogy, which includes The Fall of Paris and The Price of Glory and tells the story of the great crises of the rivalry between France and Germany.
EUR 21.66
A renowned airpower expert assesses the air campaign fought in France in 1940, explaining why the Luftwaffe was so effective against the French and British.
EUR 14.97
The German victory of 1940 stunned the world. France, major European power and owner of the world's largest armies had fallen in less than seven weeks to the might of the German Wehrmacht.
EUR 21.66This collection is curated by WW2 Theatres and not affiliated with our website, with all site photographs licensed to their respective owners.
Marc Bloch entered the campaign as a reserve captain on the staff of French First Army, working with fuel and logistical matters during the movement into Belgium and the subsequent retreat. His position placed him close to headquarters traffic, transport problems and the daily effort to turn orders into movement while the front changed around the staff.
During the summer of 1940 he wrote L'Étrange Défaite. The book combines eyewitness memory with a historian's examination of command culture, professional education, social hierarchy and the handling of information. Bloch described officers and institutions shaped by the First World War confronting a campaign in which the speed of communications, armour and operational movement demanded a different rhythm of decision.
His account also records competence, courage and improvisation among French soldiers and junior officers. The defeat in his analysis grew from institutions, assumptions and command relationships operating together across the state and army. That perspective belongs beside the maps because the campaign's changing geography was experienced through headquarters trying to understand where units, fuel, roads and enemy columns were at a given moment.
Bloch later joined the French Resistance and was executed by the Germans in 1944. L'Étrange Défaite remains a contemporary document of the 1940 campaign and a work of historical interpretation written before the later mythology of the defeat had fully formed.
The chronology follows L. F. Ellis's British official history alongside French campaign journals and command files at the Service historique de la Défense and German Fall Gelb and Fall Rot records in the Bundesarchiv. Dunkirk is kept as a campaign phase here, with its detailed naval and perimeter chronology left to the dedicated operation page.
French casualty, prisoner and exodus figures are treated through state and memorial sources with their accounting boundaries preserved. Marc Bloch's L'Étrange Défaite supplies a contemporary staff officer's analysis of the institutions and command culture through which the campaign was experienced. Exact-date archive photographs are matched to chronology events separately from the historical source list.
| Date | Event | Location | Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| Wednesday 10 January 1940 · Four months before | A German aircraft lands in Belgium with western-offensive papers | Mechelen-aan-de-Maas, Belgium | A German liaison aircraft made a forced landing near Mechelen-aan-de-Maas on 10 January with documents relating to an earlier version of the western offensive. Belgian authorities recovered part of the material after the crew tried to burn it. Sources 1, 3, 5 |
| February 1940 · Plan revised | The main German effort is shifted to the Ardennes | German Army High Command | By February the revised Fall Gelb concentrated Army Group A and seven panzer divisions opposite Luxembourg and the Ardennes, making the Meuse sector the operational centre of the western offensive. Sources 1, 3, 5 |
| Thursday 9 May 1940 · Night before | Both sides wait behind their opening positions | Western Europe | On the night of 9 May the Allied armies stood ready to execute the Dyle-Breda plan as soon as Germany entered Belgium and the Netherlands, while German Army Groups A and B waited behind their start lines. Sources 1, 2, 3 |
| Friday 10 May 1940 · Before dawn | Glider troops land on Fort Eben-Emael | Fort Eben-Emael, Belgium | German assault engineers landed DFS 230 gliders on the roof of Fort Eben-Emael before dawn on 10 May and attacked observation posts, gun positions and cupolas with shaped charges and demolition weapons. Sources 1, 3, 8 |
| Friday 10 May 1940 · Opening offensive | Germany invades the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg | The Low Countries and Luxembourg | Germany opened the western offensive on 10 May across the Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg, combining ground attack with airborne and air-landed operations against bridges, airfields and command points. Sources 1, 2, 3, 14 |
| Friday 10 May 1940 · Dyle movement begins | The Allied armies advance toward the Dyle | Belgium | The British Expeditionary Force and French First Army Group moved into Belgium on 10 May to occupy the Dyle position and join Belgian forces on a shorter defensive front. Sources 1, 2 |
| 12–14 May 1940 · Armoured battle | French and German armoured forces fight in Belgium | Hannut and Gembloux | French mechanised divisions met German panzer formations around Hannut from 12 May and then withdrew toward the prepared Gembloux position after completing their delaying mission. Sources 1, 2, 3 |
| Sunday 12 May 1940 · Approach to the Meuse | The panzer columns reach the Meuse approaches | The Ardennes | German armoured and motorised columns emerged from the Ardennes on 12 May after a congested march through Luxembourg and the forest road network, reaching the Meuse from Sedan north toward Dinant. Sources 1, 2, 3, 5 |
| Monday 13 May 1940 · Meuse crossing | German troops establish a bridgehead at Sedan | Sedan | German infantry crossed the Meuse at Sedan on 13 May after concentrated Luftwaffe attacks struck French artillery, command posts and positions around the crossing sector. Sources 1, 2, 3, 5 |
| 13–14 May 1940 · Parallel crossings | Additional German bridgeheads widen the Meuse crisis | Dinant and Monthermé | German forces established additional bridgeheads at Dinant and Monthermé during 13–14 May, widening the crisis across the French Ninth and Second Army sectors. Sources 1, 2, 3 |
| Tuesday 14 May 1940 · Bombing during negotiations | German aircraft bomb central Rotterdam | Rotterdam | German bombers struck central Rotterdam on 14 May while surrender negotiations were underway, igniting fires that devastated much of the city centre and killed hundreds of civilians. Sources 3, 5, 13 |
| Wednesday 15 May 1940 · Political warning | Paul Reynaud tells Churchill that the battle is being lost | Paris and London | French prime minister Paul Reynaud telephoned Winston Churchill on 15 May as German columns expanded beyond the Meuse bridgeheads and the central French front deteriorated. Sources 1, 4, 5 |
| 15–17 May 1940 · Repeated counterattacks | Stonne changes hands repeatedly | Stonne | French and German troops fought repeatedly for Stonne south of Sedan between 15 and 17 May, turning the village and surrounding ridges into one of the campaign's most violent local battles. Sources 2, 3, 5 |
| 17 and 19 May 1940 · French counterattack | De Gaulle attacks the southern flank of the German corridor | Montcornet and Crécy-sur-Serre | Colonel Charles de Gaulle led the newly forming 4e Division cuirassée in attacks around Montcornet on 17 May and Crécy-sur-Serre on 19 May against the southern flank and communications of the German advance. Sources 2, 5 |
| Sunday 19 May 1940 · Change of command | Maxime Weygand replaces Maurice Gamelin | French General Headquarters | The French government replaced Maurice Gamelin with Maxime Weygand on 19 May as German mobile forces approached the Channel and the northern Allied armies faced separation. Sources 1, 2, 5 |
| Monday 20 May 1940 · Channel reached | German armour reaches the Channel | Abbeville and the Somme estuary | German mobile formations reached the Channel coast near Abbeville on 20 May, completing a corridor from the Meuse to the sea and dividing the Allied armies into northern and southern groups. Sources 1, 2, 3 |
| Tuesday 21 May 1940 · Counterattack | British and French troops counterattack near Arras | Arras | British and French forces counterattacked south of Arras on 21 May, striking elements of 7th Panzer Division and neighbouring German formations with infantry and tanks. Sources 1, 2, 3 |
| Thursday 23 May 1940 · Army Group A order | Rundstedt orders the mobile formations to halt and close up | Canal line west of Dunkirk | Army Group A ordered its mobile formations to halt and close up on 23 May as the panzer advance approached the canal line west and south of Dunkirk. Sources 1, 3, 5 |
| Friday 24 May 1940 · Halt endorsed | Hitler confirms the armoured halt | Army Group A headquarters | Hitler confirmed the Army Group A halt on 24 May and restored Rundstedt's control over the mobile formations after higher-command discussion of the advance toward Dunkirk. Sources 1, 3, 5 |
| Saturday 25 May 1940 · BEF changes direction | Gort turns the British Expeditionary Force toward Dunkirk | Ypres sector | Lord Gort redirected the main effort of the British Expeditionary Force toward the Channel and Dunkirk on 25 May as the prospect of a coordinated north-south counterstroke faded. Sources 1, 5 |
| Sunday 26 May 1940 · 18:57 | Operation Dynamo begins | Dunkirk | Operation Dynamo began on the evening of 26 May under Vice-Admiral Bertram Ramsay, moving troops from Dunkirk harbour and the beaches while British and French formations held the surrounding perimeter. Sources 1, 6, 7 |
| Tuesday 28 May 1940 · Belgian capitulation | The Belgian Army ceases resistance | Belgium | King Leopold III accepted the capitulation of the Belgian armed forces on 28 May after eighteen days of fighting and growing pressure along the Lys and the shrinking northern pocket. Sources 1, 7, 8 |
| 28–31 May 1940 · Encircled battle | French formations hold an encircled position at Lille | Lille | Elements of the French First Army fought inside and around Lille from 28 to 31 May after German formations closed around them during the retreat toward Dunkirk. Sources 1, 2, 7 |
| Tuesday 4 June 1940 · Final organised sailing | The final organised Dunkirk evacuation leaves | Dunkirk | The last organised naval lift from Dunkirk departed during the early hours of 4 June after French troops had filled the final scheduled embarkations. Sources 1, 6, 7 |
| Wednesday 5 June 1940 · Fall Rot | Germany opens the second offensive against France | Somme and Aisne fronts | Fall Rot opened on 5 June against the French positions along the Somme and Aisne after the northern pocket had been eliminated and German formations had been redeployed south. Sources 1, 2, 3 |
| 9–12 June 1940 · Front breaks | German forces break through the Weygand Line | Lower Seine and Champagne | German forces broke through sectors of the Somme-Aisne defensive system between 9 and 12 June, extending the advance across the lower Seine and through Champagne. Sources 1, 2, 3 |
| Monday 10 June 1940 · Declaration of war | Italy declares war on France and Britain | Rome | Mussolini declared war on France and Britain on 10 June as the French military position deteriorated across the northern half of the country. Sources 1, 2, 5 |
| Wednesday 12 June 1940 · Capitulation | French IX Corps and the British 51st Highland Division surrender | Saint-Valery-en-Caux | French IX Corps elements and the British 51st Highland Division were trapped against the Channel around Saint-Valery-en-Caux and entered captivity on 12 June after evacuation attempts failed. Sources 1, 2, 3 |
| Friday 14 June 1940 · Capital occupied | German troops enter Paris | Paris | German troops entered Paris on 14 June after the French government had declared the capital an open city and moved south. Sources 1, 2, 5, 10 |
| Sunday 16 June 1940 · Government changes | Paul Reynaud resigns and Pétain forms a government | Bordeaux | Paul Reynaud resigned on 16 June after the cabinet divided over continuing the war from North Africa, seeking an armistice, and the proposed Anglo-French union. Sources 2, 4, 5 |
| Monday 17 June 1940 · Evacuation disaster | Luftwaffe aircraft sink the troopship Lancastria | Saint-Nazaire | Luftwaffe aircraft struck the Cunard liner Lancastria off Saint-Nazaire on 17 June while the ship was crowded with British military personnel and civilians being evacuated from western France. Sources 1, 6, 15 |
| Tuesday 18 June 1940 · BBC broadcast | Charles de Gaulle calls for continued French resistance | London | Charles de Gaulle broadcast from London on 18 June, calling on French soldiers, engineers and workers to continue the war alongside Britain and the resources of the French Empire. Sources 5, 9 |
| Friday 21 June 1940 · Afternoon | German armistice terms are presented at Compiègne | Compiègne | The French delegation led by General Charles Huntziger arrived at Compiègne on 21 June and entered the railway carriage associated with the 1918 armistice. Sources 3, 5, 12 |
| Saturday 22 June 1940 · Evening | France signs an armistice with Germany | Compiègne | General Charles Huntziger signed the Franco-German armistice at Compiègne on the evening of 22 June in the railway carriage associated with the 1918 armistice. Sources 1, 2, 3, 5, 12 |
| Monday 24 June 1940 · Second armistice | France signs an armistice with Italy | Rome | French and Italian delegations signed the Franco-Italian armistice at Villa Incisa outside Rome on 24 June at about 19:15. Sources 2, 5, 12 |
| Tuesday 25 June 1940 · 00:35 | The ceasefire takes effect | France | The German and Italian armistices entered into force at 00:35 on 25 June, ending organised campaigning in metropolitan France after forty-seven days. Sources 2, 3, 5, 9 |
Image rights and editorial standard. Bundesarchiv photographs retain the licence stated on their exact Commons file pages; British official photography follows the public-domain status recorded by Imperial War Museums and Commons; Dutch, Belgian, French and United States archive material retains the reuse basis of its individual record. Hero and chronology media use exact file records. Timeline images are attached only where the documented date and subject match the event, its immediate operational aftermath, or a tightly bounded action. PEOPLE and KIT may use later identity or exact-type imagery when the caption states that limitation. Front lines and territorial areas are generalised operational reconstructions. Casualty and prisoner figures retain the accounting boundaries of the cited historical series.
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