The Second Battle of El Alamein

By October 1942 the German and Italian army stood west of El Alamein on a front whose northern end touched the Mediterranean. The Qattara Depression barred the southern route that motorised forces had repeatedly used to turn an opponent in Cyrenaica. General Bernard Montgomery could therefore concentrate the Eighth Army against a line with identifiable sectors. Axis commanders, meanwhile, used the summer to deepen minefields, site anti-tank guns and connect infantry positions across the ridges and low desert ground.

The British attacks had to open passages through two broad mined areas, carry infantry forward to protect the lanes, and move armour beyond the guns guarding them. Tracks across the minefields were narrow enough to become congested. A tank could be delayed by a mine, by a vehicle disabled ahead of it, or by fire from guns on the far edge. Each interruption exposed engineers working on the ground and prevented the next formation from reaching its appointed position.

Montgomery assembled artillery, tanks, transport and stores before he gave the order to attack. That accumulation placed the Eighth Army in a stronger material position than Rommel’s Panzerarmee Afrika, which had to receive much of its fuel and ammunition across the Mediterranean and over a long land route from Libyan ports. The opening plan depended on timely passage through the minefields, while the larger advantage allowed Montgomery to continue fighting when the first schedule slipped.

Along the northern sector, ridges and small depressions broke the otherwise open ground. The coastal railway and road ran behind the Axis positions, and the Rahman Track provided a north–south route for reserves and transport farther west. Control of these communications became increasingly important as British infantry pressed into the first defensive belts. The Eighth Army sought a point where its armour could pass beyond the mined zone and fight with room to manoeuvre.

Southern formations of XIII Corps also attacked when the offensive opened. Their movement occupied Axis defenders and complicated decisions about shifting reserves, but the main armoured effort remained in the north. Across the entire front, fixed guns and minefields forced vehicles towards predictable openings. Infantry, supported by concentrated artillery, had to make the spaces in which tanks could operate.

Montgomery intended XXX Corps infantry to secure the first objectives while X Corps armour moved through cleared lanes into open ground. Oliver Leese coordinated the northern infantry assault; Herbert Lumsden’s armoured corps faced minefield congestion and persistent anti-tank fire. The divisions reached much of their first ground, yet the armour remained near or within the defensive belts. Montgomery shifted from an early breakthrough timetable to a series of limited attacks designed to erode the Axis position and draw German armour towards the northern battle.

At the start of the assault Georg Stumme commanded the Axis army while Rommel was in Germany receiving treatment. Stumme died on 24 October during a visit to the front. Rommel returned on 25 October to find a defensive battle in which his armour was already responding to repeated attacks. German and Italian commanders needed to preserve their mobile forces, guard the coastal communications and hold infantry positions under artillery bombardment. Fuel shortages reduced the opportunities for sustained counter-attack or rapid movement.

General Harold Alexander, as Commander-in-Chief Middle East, supported the concentration of men and resources before the attack and left Montgomery substantial control over the battle. The 9th Australian Division under Leslie Morshead and the 2nd New Zealand Division under Bernard Freyberg performed complementary roles: northern pressure tied down Axis reserves, while the New Zealand-led force helped open the later Supercharge assault. Their attacks were connected by Montgomery’s repeated reallocation of armour and artillery.

At 21:40 on 23 October the British guns began a short concentrated programme against Axis artillery positions. A pause and change of targets preceded the infantry attack at 22:00. Australian, British, New Zealand and South African troops advanced behind moving artillery fire; mine-clearing parties followed or worked beside them to mark passages for tanks and supply vehicles. The first night gave XXX Corps a substantial foothold, but the planned transit of armour across the belts remained incomplete.

Axis machine guns, mortars and anti-tank guns still covered the eastern and western edges of cleared lanes. A narrow road gap quickly attracted the vehicles of several units, and the resulting traffic delayed ammunition, recovery vehicles and fresh tanks. Engineers had to keep routes marked under shellfire and restore a lane whenever a disabled vehicle stopped traffic. By 24 October commanders had to coordinate a battle developing across several separated pockets of progress and disrupted the movement of an intact armoured column through the front.

Montgomery renewed his pressure in the northern sector after the first attempts at armoured exploitation stalled. The 9th Australian Division attacked German and Italian positions around the railway and coastal road while artillery and anti-tank units established forward positions to meet counter-attacks. On 28–29 October Australian battalions pushed north of the railway. Their exposed lodgement provoked repeated efforts to restore the Axis line of communication.

Between 30 October and 1 November the 9th Division held its ground against concentrated German attacks. Infantry positions became difficult to reinforce during daylight, and wounded men waited for evacuation behind shallow cover. Supporting field guns and anti-tank weapons fired over open ground at approaching vehicles, while aircraft struck transport and reserves. The battle in this sector consumed Axis armour and attention as Montgomery assembled the next thrust farther south.

The 25-pounder field gun supported infantry attacks with prepared concentrations, counter-battery fire and rapid defensive barrages. The British six-pounder anti-tank gun, deployed with infantry and motor formations, gave small groups a way to withstand armoured counter-attacks. Axis 8.8 cm guns and other anti-tank weapons could hold long lines of fire across open desert. Tanks on both sides had to approach these positions behind dust, smoke and artillery fire.

Sherman and Grant tanks increased the Eighth Army’s available 75 mm firepower, while Crusader tanks remained in service in armoured units. German Panzer IIIs and Italian M13/40s formed part of a mixed opposing armoured force, together with Panzer IVs and self-propelled guns. The small British Kingforce detachment even tested Churchill infantry tanks during the battle. Reconnaissance, recovery teams and the ability to move fuel and ammunition through narrow corridors were as necessary as the characteristics of any single tank.

Once artillery and infantry had weakened the Axis positions, armoured units could operate against the roads behind them. The decisive change came when the defensive gun line and its mobile reserves could no longer close the breaches made by Supercharge.

Freyberg’s New Zealand formation led the renewed infantry assault on the night of 1–2 November with British brigades under command and strong artillery support. Montgomery aimed to reach the tracks west of the mine belts, forcing the Axis armoured reserve to fight on ground where British tanks could enter the battle in strength. The 9th Armoured Brigade advanced into a dense anti-tank defence on the morning of 2 November and lost much of its armour, but its attack drew fire, exposed the German gun positions and contributed to the passage opened for following formations.

Rommel judged the battle increasingly unsustainable. His remaining mobile formations were losing tanks, fuel and freedom of movement, and infantry divisions had little transport for a rapid withdrawal. Hitler’s order of 3 November demanded that the line be held. British pressure continued, and by 4 November the Eighth Army had pierced the main defensive position. Rommel ordered withdrawal, leaving many German and Italian units to be captured as motorised formations moved west.

The Australian War Memorial gives 13,560 Eighth Army casualties for the battle. Its broader estimate of Axis losses reaches 90,000 when dead, wounded and prisoners are aggregated, but the categories and methods used in contemporary returns differed between German, Italian and Allied headquarters. Roughly 30,000 Axis troops became prisoners in the immediate defeat, most of them Italian. The scale of capture reflected the loss of transport and the collapse of defended sectors after the mobile reserves moved away.

The pursuit began as soon as Allied tanks were beyond the mine belts. German and Italian motorised columns retreated towards Libya, leaving guns, damaged vehicles and stores on the battlefield. Weather, supply and the caution of armoured commanders influenced how quickly the Eighth Army followed. The victory removed the immediate Axis threat to Egypt and opened an extended westward advance; Axis forces in North Africa continued fighting as the Allied landings in Morocco and Algeria opened another campaign on 8 November.

Montgomery’s published dispatch reconstructs the artillery timetable, intended corridors, troop movements and the decisions made as the attack developed. The Australian War Memorial’s official histories and battalion-level records show the northern fighting from the viewpoint of the troops holding positions around the railway. Their accounts give close detail on casualties and counter-attacks and can be compared with the British command narrative.

The National Army Museum and Italian Army Historical Office place the battle within the wider desert campaign and identify the respective command and supply constraints. Imperial War Museums photographs are particularly useful for dated views of guns, minefield traffic, tanks and prisoners. A photograph dated to a day of the battle documents the scene in its caption; the exact hour of an operational event comes from written records unless the photographic record establishes it.