The Vistula–Oder Offensive

The request came while German armoured forces were still committed in the Ardennes and Soviet concentrations were visible along the Vistula. Guderian warned Hitler that the Soviet buildup north of the Carpathians was the largest yet assembled and asked for the fading Ardennes offensive to be ended so reserves could move east.

The projected Hubertus withdrawal would have shortened the exposed line and moved mobile formations back from the heaviest Soviet artillery concentrations. Army Group A proposed leaving the exposed Vistula sectors before the offensive, shortening the line and moving reserves beyond the expected artillery zone.

The refusal left German commanders facing an offensive they expected but were unable to absorb with reserves protected behind the immediate front. Hitler rejected the Army Group A and Army Group Center withdrawal proposals and dismissed the intelligence estimates of Soviet strength.

1st Ukrainian Front began the attack from the Baranów-Sandomierz bridgehead on 12 January, after a powerful artillery preparation and initial infantry probes opened German positions. 1st Ukrainian Front began with an artillery concentration estimated by the German account at approximately 420 pieces per mile on the main sector.

On 13 January Konev’s armoured spearheads crossed the Nida sector, exploiting the breach toward the road junctions of central and southern Poland. 4th Tank Army turned northwest while 3rd Guards Tank Army and 52nd Army pushed west beyond Chmielnik.

Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front opened its main attack on 14 January from the Puławy and Magnuszew bridgeheads south of Warsaw. 1st Belorussian Front attacked from Magnuszew and Puławy toward Kutno, Łódź and the German rear south of Warsaw.

The German reserves committed against the breakthroughs arrived by separate routes and struggled to form a new defensive line ahead of the Soviet columns. 47th Army broke north of Warsaw toward Modlin, while Konev's armies drove the remnants of XXIV Panzer Corps away from Kielce.

The change of command took effect after Soviet forces had already penetrated the Army Group A front along multiple axes. Hitler relieved Josef Harpe and placed Ferdinand Schörner in command of Army Group A.

On 17 January troops of the 1st Polish Army and Soviet 1st Belorussian Front entered the ruins of Warsaw as the German river defence in central Poland collapsed. The Soviet fronts cleared the Vistula line from east of Kraków to west of Modlin. Konev's spearheads reached Częstochowa and Radomsko while 1st Belorussian Front entered Warsaw.

On 17 January 1945 the SS began evacuating Auschwitz and its sub-camps. About 56,000 prisoners were driven toward railheads and camps farther west as the Soviet advance threatened the remaining camp system. Guards shot people who collapsed or could not continue; thousands more died from cold, exhaustion and later transports.

The armoured advance moved beyond the initial breaches and carried Soviet mechanised units toward the major transport junctions of central Poland. Soviet mobile columns advanced beyond the Pilica and approached Łódź while German corps remnants attempted to escape west.

Soviet units entered Kraków on 19 January after the German forces withdrew, leaving its historic centre largely intact. 1st Ukrainian Front entered Kraków after the German defence withdrew under pressure from the north and east.

Soviet forces entered Łódź on 19 January and pressed west toward the Warta and the approaches to Poznań. 1st Belorussian Front occupied Łódź and continued toward the Warta and Poznań.

Konev directed mobile forces behind Upper Silesia to threaten German communications and force a withdrawal from the industrial region. Konev redirected 3rd Guards Tank Army southeast along the Oder behind the northern flank of the Upper Silesian defence.

By 22 January elements of Konev’s 1st Ukrainian Front had reached the Oder in Silesia, where engineers and forward detachments began establishing river crossings. The left wing of 1st Ukrainian Front reached the Oder. During the following days Soviet forces closed to a long section of the river and established crossings above and below Breslau.

Heinrich Himmler assumed command of the newly created Army Group Vistula as the German defence of the lower Vistula and Pomeranian approaches had become dangerously disjointed. The newly created Army Group Vistula was ordered to connect the lower Vistula with the Oder and protect the widening northern flank.

On 25 January Zhukov’s main tank forces bypassed Poznań and continued toward the middle Oder, leaving a German garrison isolated behind the advance. Zhukov's principal mobile columns bypassed Poznań and continued west toward Küstrin.

On 27 January 1945 soldiers of the 60th Army, 1st Ukrainian Front, reached Auschwitz I, Birkenau and Monowitz. They found roughly 7,000 prisoners alive in the principal camp complex, many desperately ill; the SS had already marched tens of thousands west.

As Soviet armour advanced around Upper Silesia, the remaining German forces were able to withdraw through a narrowing opening to the south. Soviet armies nearly enclosed Upper Silesia but deliberately left the southern outlet open while armour moved behind the German flank.

A heavy winter storm swept central Poland on 27–28 January, affecting the roads used by columns already far from their railheads. A blizzard on 27 and 28 January blocked roads with deep snow across central Europe.

Zhukov’s leading units reached the Oder north of Küstrin on 31 January, bringing the advancing Soviet line close to the eastern approaches to Berlin. After passing Poznań, elements of 1st Belorussian Front reached the Oder north of Küstrin and established bridgeheads on the western bank.

The leading Soviet formations held and enlarged their Oder lodgements as fuel, bridging and infantry units caught up and German units remained on the northern flank. Soviet formations expanded bridgeheads, brought artillery and supplies forward and reinforced the lengthening northern flank.

At the beginning of February the main Vistula–Oder advance had reached the Oder and the Soviet command prepared to consolidate its position before the next major offensive. The operational advance ended with Soviet bridgeheads north of Küstrin and south of Frankfurt, while German forces still held bridgeheads at the major crossings.