Battle of Stalingrad

Forward elements of Sixth Army met formations of the newly created Stalingrad Front west of the Don bend on 17 July. The German army was still fighting a mobile approach battle: its immediate problem was to drive through Soviet screening forces, secure crossings and bring enough fuel and ammunition forward to keep the eastward advance moving.

Hitler’s Directive No. 45 divided the summer offensive between the Caucasus and the lower Volga. Army Group A was to continue toward the Caucasian oil regions, while Sixth Army was ordered to defeat Soviet forces around Stalingrad, take the city and cut traffic on the Volga.

Sixth Army attacked the Soviet bridgehead west of the Don in early August and brought armoured and infantry formations around substantial elements of 62nd Army and 1st Tank Army. German mobile forces were again operating in terrain that favoured encirclement, using the river and the contracting Soviet position to limit withdrawal routes.

German infantry forced crossings of the Don north of Kalach and engineers expanded the bridgehead for the mobile formations that would follow. The river crossing placed Sixth Army on the last major natural barrier before Stalingrad, but every formation sent east also depended on bridges and roads running back through a narrow logistical corridor.

After driving roughly sixty kilometres east from the Don bridgehead, the leading elements of 16th Panzer Division reached the Volga at the northern edge of Stalingrad at about 16:00. The thrust cut the riverbank road north of the city and put German tanks within sight of the industrial district.

At 16:18, according to the local battle chronology, Luftflotte 4 opened the mass air attack on Stalingrad. Successive bomber and dive-bomber formations struck rail facilities, industrial and river targets and extensive residential areas. Fires spread rapidly through wooden housing districts and smoke obscured large parts of the city.

On 3 September leading elements of Sixth Army and Fourth Panzer Army made contact near Pitomnik west of Stalingrad. The junction closed the gap between the German forces approaching from the northwest and south, but 62nd and 64th Armies had already withdrawn toward the inner city defences and avoided being trapped on the open steppe.

Vasily Chuikov assumed command of 62nd Army as German formations reached the inner approaches to Stalingrad. His army held a long, shallow bridgehead with the Volga directly behind it and depended on crossings from the east bank for reinforcements, ammunition and replacement units.

German divisions attacked into central Stalingrad on 13 September toward Mamayev Kurgan, the railway station and the Volga landing areas. LI Corps sought to break through the Soviet centre, split 62nd Army’s bridgehead and reach the river crossings before the defenders could reinforce them.

During the night of 14–15 September, Major General Alexander Rodimtsev’s 13th Guards Rifle Division crossed the Volga into a crisis around the central landing stages. German troops had reached parts of the railway station area and threatened to separate the surviving Soviet positions from their principal crossing points.

By 16 September Soviet and German troops were fighting across the summit and slopes of Mamayev Kurgan. The height overlooked central Stalingrad and offered observation toward the Volga, railway lines and adjoining districts, making it valuable to artillery observers and infantry commanders on both sides.

By 26 September German forces had occupied much of southern and central Stalingrad and reached the Volga at several points. The advance divided the Soviet-held western bank into increasingly separate sectors, leaving 62nd Army dependent on several small crossing and supply areas along the river.

On 14 October Sixth Army concentrated 14th Panzer Division, 305th Infantry Division and supporting formations against the northern industrial sector. Tanks and panzer grenadiers moved at first light under heavy artillery and air support, while engineers attacked strongpoints around the tractor factory and workers’ settlements.

LI Corps renewed its attack on 23 October with 79th Infantry Division leading against the Red October metallurgical works while other formations continued fighting around Barrikady. By afternoon German troops had taken part of the metallurgical complex, blocks west of the bakery and much of the bakery itself; a spearhead reached the Volga by nightfall.

Four hours before daylight on 11 November, LI Corps opened another concentrated attack east of the Barrikady gun factory. Five combat-engineer battalions reinforced infantry formations that had been worn down by two months of urban fighting. The immediate objective was to eliminate the remaining Soviet bridgeheads along the Volga bank.

On 13 November Zhukov and Vasilevsky presented the prepared counteroffensive to Stalin, the Politburo and Stavka after a series of front-level inspections and planning conferences. The operation would use Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad Fronts to strike the Axis flanks north and south of the city, then send mobile formations toward Kalach.

At 07:30, after the Soviet alert and fire commands had been transmitted through the northern armies, roughly 3,500 guns and mortars opened on the Romanian Third Army. Snow and poor visibility limited air activity, but the frozen ground allowed heavy formations to move once breaches appeared.

Stalingrad Front began its attack on 20 November after Yeremenko delayed the opening for several hours because fog prevented effective coordination and air support. Once the assault began, 57th and 51st Armies broke through the Romanian VI Corps along the lake chain south of Stalingrad.

Before dawn on 22 November, an advance detachment from XXVI Tank Corps reached the Don crossing at Kalach and captured the bridge before German defenders could destroy it. Surprise and the speed of the Soviet approach secured the key crossing largely intact.

On 23 November the mobile formations advancing from north and south met near Sovetskiy east of Kalach. Their junction closed the main land routes behind Stalingrad and enclosed Sixth Army, elements of Fourth Panzer Army, Romanian units and attached Luftwaffe and support personnel in a pocket between the Don and Volga.

Hitler rejected an immediate evacuation of Stalingrad and ordered Sixth Army to establish an all-round defensive position while retaining the city. The decision assumed that the pocket could be sustained by air until relief forces restored a ground connection.

During the first days after encirclement, Sixth Army reported deliveries far below the tonnage required to maintain the force. Paulus again sought freedom of action through the new Army Group Don command, arguing that the army could not remain effective if the supply deficit continued.

Manstein’s new Army Group Don developed a relief plan built around Fourth Panzer Army and LVII Panzer Corps. The strongest available grouping would attack from the Kotelnikovo area toward the southern face of the pocket; a second thrust from the Chir sector remained dependent on forces that were not available in sufficient strength.

On 12 December LVII Panzer Corps began Operation Winter Storm from the Kotelnikovo sector. The initial striking force centred on 6th and 23rd Panzer Divisions, with Romanian forces covering parts of the flanks. Its objective was to drive north-east through Soviet positions and restore contact with Sixth Army.

On 16 December Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts opened the reduced version of Operation Saturn against the Italian Eighth Army on the middle Don. Soviet rifle armies broke the front and mobile formations drove toward Axis rear areas, airfields and communications farther west.

By 19 December the spearheads of LVII Panzer Corps had reached the Myshkova River, bringing the relief force to within roughly fifty to sixty kilometres of the pocket’s southern edge. The advance had outrun some supporting formations and now faced increasingly strong Soviet resistance, including 2nd Guards Army.

Army Group Don and Sixth Army staffs discussed a breakout toward the relief force while the latter stood on the Myshkova. Manstein’s concept required Sixth Army to strike southwest once the relief operation created a favourable moment, but the army still had orders to retain Stalingrad and could not simply evacuate the pocket on its own authority.

By 23 December Fourth Panzer Army had to break off the drive toward Stalingrad. Soviet attacks had checked the spearhead at the Myshkova and the collapse of Axis positions farther west threatened the relief force’s communications and the broader Army Group Don front.

On 8 January Don Front delivered surrender terms to Sixth Army before opening the final offensive. The offer promised food and medical treatment to prisoners and preservation of officers’ rank and personal effects under Soviet terms.

Don Front opened Operation Ring on 10 January with a massive artillery preparation followed by attacks by 65th, 21st and 24th Armies against the western face of the pocket. Soviet forces aimed first to rupture the outer defensive belt and then drive east toward the German airfields and Stalingrad.

On 16 January Soviet forces captured Pitomnik, the principal airfield inside the pocket. The field had handled transport aircraft bringing supplies and had also been the main point for flying wounded and selected personnel out of Stalingrad.

During the night of 21–22 January Soviet forces took Gumrak as the western perimeter broke toward Stalingrad. The field had become the principal landing ground after Pitomnik’s loss, and its capture ended the remaining regular transport-aircraft operation inside the pocket.

On 26 January troops of 21st Army advancing from the west linked with 62nd Army on the north-western slopes of Mamayev Kurgan. The meeting connected the forces that had fought inward through the pocket with the army that had held the Volga bridgehead since the city battle.

On 30 January Hitler promoted Paulus to field marshal as the southern pocket collapsed around the city centre. The promotion did not provide Sixth Army with a new operational option. By the morning of 31 January Soviet troops had reached the command post in the Univermag basement and the headquarters could no longer direct organised resistance across the southern group.

On the morning of 2 February the northern pocket around the factory district ceased organised resistance. XI Corps transmitted its final message at about 08:40 and its remaining formations surrendered to Soviet forces.