Operation Barbarossa

Directive No. 21 ordered the German armed forces to prepare to crush the Soviet Union in a rapid campaign while the war with Britain continued. Its first military task was the destruction of Soviet forces deployed in western Russia through deep armoured penetrations that would prevent an organised retreat into the interior.

At a conference with about 250 senior commanders and staff officers on 30 March, Hitler described the coming invasion as an ideological struggle against Bolshevism and demanded exceptional violence against the Soviet political system.

German economic planners expected the armed forces and the Reich to feed themselves from conquered Soviet territory. The grain surplus they intended to divert from Ukraine and other producing regions also sustained Soviet industrial cities and northern deficit zones.

The 13 May decree on military jurisdiction in the Barbarossa area removed major legal restraints before German troops entered Soviet territory. It authorised summary action against civilians suspected of resistance and made prosecution of German personnel for offences against Soviet civilians non-obligatory in many circumstances.

The Commissar Order instructed German forces to identify Soviet political commissars captured with Red Army units and separate them from other prisoners for execution. Political office became a category for killing outside normal prisoner-of-war procedure.

During the night of 21–22 June, the Soviet defence leadership transmitted Directive No. 1 warning the western military districts that a German attack might begin within hours. Units were ordered to occupy firing positions discreetly and bring air forces to readiness while avoiding actions that Moscow feared could be represented as a provocation.

Around 03:15 on 22 June, German artillery, aircraft and ground forces opened the invasion from the Baltic region to the Soviet frontier opposite Ukraine. Romanian forces supported the southern campaign, while German-Finnish operations developed separately farther north.

German artillery and assault troops struck the Brest fortress complex as mobile formations crossed the Bug and moved beyond it. Fighting inside the fortress continued after the operational front had already passed east.

Southwestern Front committed several mechanised corps against First Panzer Group around Lutsk, Dubno and Brody. The fighting developed over the following week and became the largest armoured concentration of the frontier battles.

On 24 June the Soviet government created the Evacuation Council to organise the movement of industrial plant, workers and other resources away from threatened western regions. The frontier battles were only two days old, yet the state had begun preparing to preserve production if large territories were lost.

Elements of Manstein's LVI Motorized Corps reached Daugavpils and seized crossings over the Dvina before the Soviet command could establish a stable defence on the river. Army Group North had covered the distance from East Prussia to one of the campaign's first major river barriers in four days.

Second and Third Panzer Groups closed east of Minsk after sweeping around Soviet forces deployed farther west. Large parts of Western Front were trapped in overlapping Białystok and Minsk pockets while German infantry armies marched forward to form tighter inner rings.

On 30 June the State Defence Committee was created under Stalin with extraordinary authority over mobilisation, production, transport, evacuation and internal administration. The frontier catastrophe produced a more concentrated wartime government at the centre of the Soviet state.

Romanian Third and Fourth Armies, operating with the German Eleventh Army, opened the main offensive across the Prut into Bessarabia and northern Bukovina. Romania entered the campaign with objectives rooted in territories ceded to the Soviet Union in 1940.

On 3 July Stalin spoke publicly after eleven days of invasion, addressing the population as 'brothers and sisters' and presenting the conflict as a struggle for the survival of the Soviet state. He called for resistance in occupied territory and for movable resources to be evacuated or denied to the enemy.

By 9 July organised resistance in the principal Białystok–Minsk pockets had been crushed or dispersed after repeated Soviet breakout attempts. German headquarters reported more than 300,000 prisoners from the battles.

Army Group Centre attacked the Soviet second strategic echelon along and beyond the Dvina–Dnieper line. The mobile groups attempted to repeat the Minsk method around Smolensk before Soviet reserve armies could establish a stable defence.

German mobile formations entered Smolensk on 16 July while the intended encirclement east of the city remained incomplete. Panzer spearheads were extended, Soviet forces held crossings and escape routes, and counterattacks struck the German shoulders.

At a conference on 16 July, Hitler and senior officials discussed the administration, exploitation and permanent political control of the occupied Soviet territories. Conquest was being planned as a long-term reordering of territory and population while the army was still fighting around Smolensk.

Directive No. 33 shifted German attention toward the flanks while the Smolensk battle continued. Army Group North was to press toward Leningrad, and operations in Ukraine gained greater weight as German leaders considered the Soviet forces still active south of Army Group Centre.

By early August the principal Smolensk pockets had been reduced, while Soviet attacks continued around Yelnya and elsewhere on the central front. Mobile formations that had covered hundreds of kilometres since 22 June required maintenance, replacements and renewed supply stocks.

First Panzer Group and Seventeenth Army trapped much of the Soviet Sixth and Twelfth Armies around Uman after the German and Romanian advance forced the southern front back from the old frontier.

Hitler's decision of 21 August rejected the Army High Command's proposal for an immediate concentration on Moscow. The principal pre-winter objectives were defined as the Crimea and Donets region in the south and the isolation of Leningrad in the north; Second Panzer Group was directed south against Southwestern Front.

Zhukov's Reserve Front opened a concentrated offensive against the German salient around Yelnya, southeast of Smolensk. Soviet armies attacked the shoulders of the protruding position with the aim of forcing the defenders to abandon it.

German forces completed their withdrawal from the Yelnya salient and Soviet troops re-entered the town. The withdrawal shortened the German line and released formations from an exposed position that had become expensive to defend.

Army Group North reached Lake Ladoga at Shlisselburg on 8 September and severed Leningrad's last direct land connection with the Soviet interior. The city's rail and road links east were cut.

Second Panzer Group drove south across the Desna while First Panzer Group moved north from the Kremenchuk bridgehead. The two mobile forces were operating behind the principal armies of Southwestern Front and closing the eastern exits from the Kyiv salient.

Elements of Guderian's and Kleist's panzer groups met near Lokhvytsia on 16 September, closing the main ring east of Kyiv. Several Soviet armies and the headquarters of Southwestern Front were trapped inside a pocket whose eastern exits had been narrowed over the preceding days.

After repeated requests and changing instructions, Southwestern Front received authority during 17 September to abandon Kyiv. The main German encirclement had already closed near Lokhvytsia on the previous day.

German troops entered Kyiv on 19 September after Soviet forces abandoned the city. The main encirclement battle continued east of the Dnieper, where the armies of Southwestern Front were still attempting to break out.

Southwestern Front headquarters attempted to escape east in small groups as the pocket fragmented. Mikhail Kirponos, who had commanded the front from the frontier battles through the Kyiv crisis, was killed during the breakout on 20 September.

By 26 September organised resistance in the principal Kyiv pocket had been crushed, although scattered groups continued trying to escape. German headquarters claimed approximately 665,000 prisoners from the operation.

German notices ordered the Jews of Kyiv to assemble on 29 September with documents, valuables and clothing under the false pretext of resettlement. Victims were marched toward the Babyn Yar ravine, forced to surrender possessions and clothing, and taken in groups to the killing site.

On 30 September Second Panzer Group attacked toward Orel and Bryansk, two days before the main Army Group Centre offensive began. The movement marked the transition from the summer campaign into Operation Typhoon.